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Bases and mechanisms of regionalism
in post-Soviet Central Asia
The research article analyses the bases and mechanisms of regionalism in the post-Soviet Central
Asia resulting from the disintegration of the previous system. The main objectives of the paper
are: identification of the most crucial determinants and constraints on the new regionalism and
building of the regional identity in the above-mentioned territory, examination of the main non-
economic areas of integration and cooperation between different Central Asian countries, and
analysis of the mechanisms of their interdependence in the context of their independence and
particular interests. The author attempts to answer the following questions: how the above re-
gionalism may influence the post-Soviet space and geopolitical power of countries in the region?
Whether and how can external players foster the development of regionalism? The case study of
Central Asia is developed through the empirical analysis and interpretation of data and docu-
ments of the regional organizations and national agencies and the analytical theoretical research
on regionalism.
Podstawy i mechanizmy regionalizmu
w postradzieckiej Azji Centralnej
W artykule analizowane s¹ podstawy i mechanizmy regionalizmu w postradzieckiej Azji Central-
nej, wynikaj¹cego z dezintegracji uprzednio funkcjonuj¹cego tam systemu. G³ównymi celami ni-
niejszej pracy s¹: identyfikacja najwa¿niejszych determinantów i ograniczeñ dla nowego
regionalizmu na omawianym terenie oraz dla budowania regionalnej to¿samoœci, rozpoznanie
g³ównych pozaekonomicznych obszarów integracji i wspó³pracy krajów Azji Centralnej i analiza
mechanizmów ich wspó³zale¿noœci w kontekœcie ich niezale¿noœci i partykularnych interesów.
Autorka próbuje odpowiedzieæ na pytania, jak omawiany regionalizm wp³ywa na obszar postra-
dziecki i geopolityczn¹ si³ê krajów w regionie oraz czy i w jaki sposób aktorzy zewnêtrzni mog¹
sprzyjaæ rozwojowi regionalizmu. Analiza przypadku regionu Azji Centralnej obejmuje badania
empiryczne i interpretacjê danych opartych na dokumentach organizacji regionalnych i agencji
rz¹dowych oraz na badaniach teoretycznych nad regionalizmem.
Keywords: Central Asia, regionalism, regional integration
JEL classification: F15, O19, R10
Introduction
At the international level, regionalism means effective forms of mutual inter-
national cooperation under preferential conditions. According to Edward Hali¿ak
and Roman KuŸniar, regionalism aims at maximising development, security, so-
vereignty, prestige, international role, needs, and interests [Hali¿ak, KuŸniar, 2006].
In turn, regionalization processes refer to informal relations of business, interest
groups, or other public and private companies [Libman, Vinokurov, 2011]. Regio-
nalization “develops from the bottom up through societally driven processes coming
from markets, private trade, and investment flows, none of which is strictly con-
trolled by governments. The core players are non-governmental actors – firms or
individuals” [Hoshiro, 2013].
In contemporary theories of regional development it is recognized that diffe-
rentiation in levels of economic development of the states in a certain region is
a crucial determinant of economies’ complementarity. According to the neoclassical
theory, the development of more advanced partners implies a growth of poorer
countries and regions due to effective allocation and use of factors of production.
In turn, the polarization theory says that as a result of development dispropor-
tions, more advanced regions attract capital and highly qualified labourers,
whereas less advanced ones are not able to level these disproportions (so-called
“polarization effect” or “backward wave effect”) [Doro¿yñski, 2011].
Apart from the economic conditions, one should remember that regional
awareness and regional community’s needs and interests are also an important
determinant. The essence of regionalism is the type and frequency of interactions
and political will of decision-makers.
One of the dimensions of regionalism is regional integration; it is the most ad-
vanced stage of regionalism development. Integration and cooperation are based
on the definition of common goals, interests, and problems shared through various
forms of interdependence [Kubicek, 2009].
Regional integration can be visible in the economic sphere, common identity
as a close-knit community based on common values, and common political insti-
tutions as a collective method of fulfilling practical tasks. Olga Butorina defines re-
gional integration as “a model of collective behaviour in the context of global
stratification. The creation of supra-national bodies, the expansion of regional
trade, and the introduction of a common currency or citizenship – all of these are
the instruments and products of regional integration” [Butorina, 2007].
As an effect of integration, involved participants move their activity to a new
centre – a new organizational community. However, the above process is in fa-
vour of their national interests’ development. It is a part of state’s political strategy
(top-down integration) [Jeliñski, 2008; Haas, 1961]. That notwithstanding, the
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bottom-up integration developed by the companies (investment activities of cor-
porations, informal links) should not be forgotten, too.
The article examines the main determinants of regionalism in post-Soviet
Central Asia, the most significant directions of regional integration (pathways of
the regional order), and areas of interests and influence of external players.
We can notice different forms of interdependencies on the post-Soviet terri-
tory (including the Central Asia region), such as sectorial and institutional coope-
ration. Thus, there are many questions about the future shape and form of integra-
tion and cooperation in the said region. It seems that any alternative regional project
could not exist successfully without some external initiative.
1. The most crucial determinants and constraints
of a new regionalism in the post-Soviet Central Asia
Regional integration is based on many different conditions, such as geographi-
cal proximity, economic complementarity, similarity of political systems, cultural
and ideological correspondence that facilitates the negotiation process, and social
structure [Haas, 1961].
Joseph Nye specifies four conditions that characterize successful integration
process: politicization, redistribution, reduction of alternatives, and externaliza-
tion [Nye, 1980].
The processes in the post-Soviet area are dynamic. According to the integral
approach (so called “transgression”), the analysis of mechanisms and phenomena
observable in the post-Soviet area should take into account the specific historical,
cultural, religious, geostrategic, geo-political, and geo-economic conditions.
Although some experts perceive the post-Soviet regionalism through the European
integration process, it should be noted that contemporary post-Soviet Eurasian
integration is hermeneutically placed in the context of the Soviet tradition [Vino-
kurov, 2013].
The post-Soviet Central Asia can be understood as a separate region of Eurasian
continent or a separate sub-region within the common post-Soviet area. The
United Nations Statistics Division separates the geographical sub-region of Cen-
tral Asia from the continental Asia region. The sub-region unites five former Soviet
republics: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan
[UNSD].
All of the Central Asian countries are political successors of former Soviet re-
publics, their presidents are former communist leaders, and the leading parties
are former communist parties. With the collapse of the USSR, the heads of Central
Asian states have strengthened their power and reduced political opposition –
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which means absence of democratic regimes and development of authoritarian or
even totalitarian (e.g. in Turkmenistan under Niyazov) tendencies. Most of the
authoritarian leaders preside over natural resources-rich states and have been
strengthened by sustained high oil prices (neo-authoritarian political systems). An
important factor of national identity building in the region is the Islamic religion.
Development of the radical Islamic groups (also in neighbouring countries such as
Afghanistan or Pakistan) fosters a consolidation of authoritarian power [Kono-
pelko, 2009]. Though on the other hand, “so-called counterterrorism may mask
clan or other ethnic and political repression” [Nichol, 2014].
In addition to the political, historic, language, ethnic, and religion similarities,
one of the important determinants of regionalism in Central Asia is visible in mu-
tual pervasion and acceptance of values (regional awareness and identity), compa-
rable patterns and ideas on the mutual interrelations, absence of political pressure,
new perception of globalization and regionalism (new paradigm), and quality
change in growing needs and interests of the states [Kubicek, 2009].
However, the failure of some regional integration projects results from both
external and internal conditions. Significant constraints lie in economic dispro-
portions, multiplicity of economic systems, and high degree of economic interde-
pendence. For example, the biggest energy-oriented economy in the region,
Kazakhstan, is a major trade and labour destination for small economies of its Kyr-
gyzstan and Tajikistan partners. The second biggest economy of Turkmenistan
shows a different model of economic system (closed economy), while Uzbekistan
exports a significant proportion of its products with a relatively high level of proce-
ssing (cotton and gold).
Considering the global economic problems, development barriers are also
characteristic of the developing countries of Central Asia: low living standards,
poor infrastructure, shortage of key development resources, and a decrease in in-
traregional trade in exchange for an increase in interregional trade. Other domes-
tic weaknesses concern: weak political institutions arising from the transition of
post-Soviet system, little experience in state sovereignty aspect, predominance of
clan structures in public life, religious and ethnic conflicts, consolidation of
authoritarian power, and high level of corruption. The visible divergence of par-
ticular interests comes from the strengthening of national identity and security
anxieties consequential to terrorism, religious extremism, drug-trafficking, and il-
legal migration. The external factor diminishing regional integration results from
the geopolitical rivalry of key actors over the influence in the region, especially he-
gemonic and dominant economic, military, and political role of Russia in any inte-
gration projects [Sergeev, Kazantsev, Bartenev, 2013].
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2. Main areas of regional integration. Pathways of regional order
Within regionalization processes, the economic and political spheres are inter-
related. Countries, as the participants of regional integration, are political units.
Regionalism is subordinate to superior goals of the state foreign policy [Hali¿ak,
KuŸniar, 2006].
Central Asian states participate in various regional and supraregional struc-
tures. Most of them are created by the Russian Federation and intraregional inte-
gration is rather weak.
Table 1. Institutional regional engagement of the post-Soviet Central Asian countries
Country
Institution
Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan
Turkme-
nistan
Uzbekistan
CIS x x x
associated
member
x
EurAsEC x x x
Custom Union/EEU x
SES x
CAEC/CACO x x x x
ECO x x x x x
CSTO x x x x
SCO x x x x
Source: Own elaboration, based on official websites of: CIS – Commonwealth of Independent States;
EurAsEC – Eurasian Economic Community, EEU – Eurasian Economic Union; SES – Single Economic
Space; CAEC – Central Asian Economic Community/CACO – Central Asian Cooperation Organization;
ECO – Economic Cooperation Organization; CSTO – Collective Security Treaty Organization; SCO –
Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
The Commonwealth of Independent States, established in 1991, consists of nine
full (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia,
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan) and two associated members (Turkmenistan, Ukraine) [CIS].
The CIS has proved unable to move its decision-making procedures to the su-
pranational level. The success of the CIS integration has been weakened by na-
tional fears of losing the autonomy in decision-making and by concerns about
distributional imbalances [Hansen, 2013]. Failure of the CIS project is determined
by political, economic, population, and territorial dominance of Russia. However,
the CIS member countries initiated other integration projects in the security (Col-
lective Security Treaty Organization) and economic area (Eurasian Economic
Community).
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The Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) is an international organiza-
tion that since 2000 has ensured multilateral economic cooperation among its
member states – Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, and Tajikistan. Uzbeki-
stan joined the Community in 2006, but it suspended its participation in 2008. In
2002 Moldova and Ukraine were granted observer status at the EurAsEC, and in
2003 the same status was granted to Armenia. During their meeting in 2006, the
heads of the member states made a decision to establish the Customs Union
within the EurAsEC framework, between Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia as its
initial members [EEC].
It is underlined that EurAsEC with its Eurasian Development Bank is one of
the most effective regional organization in the post-Soviet area, not only due to its
focus on institutions and formal cooperation, but also on financial and economic
sectorial projects [Libman, 2011]. The greatest benefits are visible in Russian and
Kazakh investments and Uzbek export markets for its gas, cotton, metal, and agri-
culture products.
The Customs Union between these three EurAsEC members started in 2010
and it is supposed to be only the first step on the path to closer cooperation. Other
steps include establishing the Single Economic Space and Eurasian Economic Union.
Single Economic Space was formally initiated in 2012 by Russia, Belarus, and
Kazakhstan. Most of specific documents on macroeconomic, energetic, and trans-
port issues, as well as movement of capital and labour are still under negotiations.
Nevertheless, non-visa regime and open access to labour markets were achieved
[Wiœniewska, 2013].
It could be noted that the consequential mutual benefits are asymmetric. In
the political domain, the main beneficiary, Russia, strengthens its position in the
post-Soviet region. In the economic area, in spite of an increase in total intrare-
gional trade, the mutual trade exchange remains unbalanced. Only Russia noted
a positive balance in trade [Œwie¿ak, 2013]. Apart from preferential conditions for
means of transport, furniture, and pharmaceuticals import, the Common Custom
Tariff caused an increase in average Kazakh custom. Non-tariff barriers still limit
the trade [UNECE, 2012].
In 2011, the presidents of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan signed an agreement
on the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) creation in 2015. The official agreement
was signed on May 29, 2014. According to Moscow plans, the EEU will be enlarged
with almost all of the CIS countries. It could be a counterweight to the European
Union and would be based on the Customs Union. A core of the future EEU will be
Russia and the republics of Central Asia. Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan are
its next potential members, although they would play a marginal role in the inte-
gration process [EEC, 2013].
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According to the World Bank analysis, the main beneficiary of the union will
be Russia. Critics of the Eurasian integration model notice that it will deepen the
political dependence of the member states on Russia and limit their actual sover-
eignty. Moreover, such a union does not have to provide regional stabilization for
Russia’s involvement in conflicts between the former Soviet republics.
In 1994, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan established the
Central Asian Economic Community, in 2002 transformed into the Central Asian
Cooperation Organization (CACO). Major goals of the above organizations in-
clude deepening of international division of labour, increase of an openness of na-
tional economy, internationalization of economic activities, and acceleration of
scientific and technical progress. The CACO's main objectives were to provide the
necessary preconditions for effective cooperation in the political, economic, envi-
ronmental, cultural, scientific, and technical spheres. Due to the visible political
and economic divergences between the member countries, it has never been an
active and truly dynamic organization. In 2005, after the Russian accession, it
joined the EurAsEC organization [Allison, 2004; Konoñczuk, 2007].
The Economic Cooperation Organization was created in 1985 by Iran, Paki-
stan, and Turkey as an intergovernmental regional body to promote economic,
technical, and cultural cooperation. In 1992 it was expanded to include two of the
Central Asian republics, Azerbaijan and Afghanistan [ECO]. Its main priorities are:
enhancement of intraregional trade, removal of impediments blocking transit
trade and transport, increased integration of the landlocked countries with global
markets, and improved regional cooperation in agriculture, energy, drug control,
minerals exploitation, and intraregional tourism [Herzig, 2004].
Further integration steps, such as free trade area in region, simplification and
harmonization of customs system and transit trade procedures, creation of the
Railway Network, and establishment of the Parliamentary Assembly, were an-
nounced in 2013 [ECO Chronicle, 2013].
The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), based on the Tashkent
Treaty from 1992, was initiated in 2002 by Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan [CSTO].
The CSTO is the main military alliance in the CIS space. The Treaty has the
regulatory machinery usually associated with more complex collective security
systems. It was designed to address new external threats and challenges through
a joint military command, by a rapid reaction force for Central Asia, a common air
defence system, and a “coordinated action” in foreign security and defence policy
[Hansen, 2013].
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was proclaimed in 2001 by
Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan and it outlined
the enhancement of trust resources in military issues, and reciprocal reduction of
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military forces in border area, combating terrorism, extremism, and separatism
[SCO]. This new model of cooperation, based on the “Shanghai Spirit” and respect
for diversified civilizations, relies on informal, less legalistic regulations and multi-
lateral discussions [Aris, 2009]. However, Russia and China are being seen using
the SCO as a macroregional balancing mechanism against the US [Allison, 2004].
In 2003, the SCO established the Business Council and Consortium of the SCO
Banks. China expected to create a free trade area, too. For more than ten years Bei-
jing has been giving credits to Central Asian countries. The above policy meets
Russia’s resistance, as it does not want to transform the SCO into an efficient econo-
mic organization, alternative to the EurAsEC or the Customs Union [Konoñczuk,
2007].
3. External players’ engagement in the development
of a new regional architecture
The countries of Central Asia are not situated in a peripheral area of the world
system anymore. They have become the “bargain powers” in the context of the in-
ternational rivalry (so-called “The New Great Game”) and contribute significantly
to the evolving architecture of regionalization [Rashid, 2002].
The Russian Federation uses its position with regard to the post-Soviet Cen-
tral Asia countries through the instruments of trade policy – lower customs, lower
prices for oil and gas, control over oil and gas pipelines, security “umbrella” (mili-
tary cooperation), and institutional integration. President Vladimir Putin, on the
bases of the “Russian identity” restoration, protection of the Russian-speaking
population rights, and closer neighbourly policy between former Soviet Union
countries, seeks to strengthen political and economic Eurasian integration con-
trolled by Russia as its informal leader [Menkiszak, 2014].
Russian leaders try to prevent the Central Asian region from establishing rela-
tions with its rivals, such as China, USA, or Iran, and from directing the Central
Asia energy resources to alternative recipients.
As from recently, crucial problems and differences between participants’ part-
ners in Eurasian integration projects could be observed. The Kazakhstan leaders
argue against the transformation of economic projects into a political integration
platform with Russia as a leader. Such a shape of integration becomes contradic-
tory to Nazarbayev policy to strengthen the Kazakhstan’s sovereignty and its in-
dependent role on the international stage [Jarosiewicz, 2013].
Similarly, objections to the Russian integration are expressed by the President
of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko. In the economic dimension, the criticism con-
cerns the pace of legal rules’ implementation and maintained non-tariff trade bar-
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riers between the member countries. In the political sphere, the leaders of
Kazakhstan and Belarus criticized Russia’s strong domination in the whole pro-
cess, visible for example in the case of copying the Russian legal norms to the Cus-
toms Union regulations [Wiœniewska, 2013].
China’s primary goals in the region of Central Asia concentrate on economic,
infrastructure, and security issues. By its involvement in the development of new
transport routes (in Kazakhstan or Turkmenistan) and hydrocarbon fields, by di-
versifying its access to energy resources, enhancing its military presence in the
region, and upholding the Central Asian regimes, China tends to weaken geopo-
litical rivals’ influence in Central Asia [Simonov, 2005].
The scale of the United States’ involvement in the region has varied over time.
However, after the attacks of September 11, 2001, the position of Central Asia in
the US foreign policy shifted from peripheral to centre. It focused on security is-
sues, especially in the context of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iranian neighbour-
hood and radical militant Islam presence in the region. The US, in favour of
regional security, supports border controls over drug trafficking and the fight
with terrorism. By the means of the GUUAM organization, it helped Uzbekistan
train their mobile anti-terrorists units and develop the information centre on nar-
cotics and terrorism; nevertheless, the US assistance was limited to the Andijan
massacre. In 2014 the ISAF troops will be withdrawn from Afghanistan, so the
question of regional stabilization remains open [Simonov, 2005].
Iran lacks the political and economic resources needed in order for it to be-
come a regional hegemon in post-Soviet Central Asia, and is effectively excluded
by both geography and ideology from the main Western and Russian regional ini-
tiatives. Thus, it focused on bilateral cooperation with Tajikistan. To limit the US
influence in the region, it seeks alternative forms of cooperation between the Mus-
lim states, such as the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO).
The European Union is not a great power in the region of Central Asia, but it
remains an important trading partner (mainly of Kazakhstan) and therefore plays
a significant role in international cooperation initiatives. The determinants of the
European Union interest in Central Asia region concern the economic, energetic,
transport, and security issues, as well as its relations with Russia. The European
Union and Central Asia. Strategy for a New Partnership signed in 2007 was sup-
ported through the EU financial assistance. The European Community Regional
Strategy Paper for Assistance to Central Asia for the period 2007–2013 provided
a total amount of EUR 750 mn of financial support for Central Asia countries
[EEAS, 2012].
Under the resolutions of the New European Strategy Programme for Central
Asia 2014–2020, the EU is to allocate EUR 1 bn to support the development of Cen-
tral Asian countries. The funding will be provided on a bilateral basis and within
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regional programs [EC, 2013]. However, it is still insufficient in comparison to the
Chinese or Russian offer of EUR 10 bn of the anti-crisis fund and lower gas prices.
Conclusions
The idea of one integrated region in the post-Soviet area brought about the
disintegration of the Commonwealth of Independent States zone. The multilate-
ral general agreements and the large number of bilate- ral agreements determined
the CIS’s failure to evolve into a highly integrated economic entity and prevented
an opportunity for a political union to be formed within the CIS framework
[PIEESC, 2012].
The CIS area has become more fragmented. Russia has failed to keep the
whole terrain united and each country’s membership is characterized by a certain un-
willingness to undertake the common project. There is little reason to expect that
Russia would be more successful in this respect in the future [Hansen, 2013].
Russia’s idea of a “multi-speed” integration is based on a deepening of mutual
integration by the core countries, strengthening of their bargaining powers with
respect to non-member states, and putting pressure on other countries to join the
project they initiated [Libman, Vinokurov, 2012].
In post-Soviet Central Asia, two ideas of regional integration can be distin-
guished. Within the first one, the political transition and regional integration are
determined by political elites (top-down integration). Russian political leaders
emphasize that the idea of the Eurasian Economic Union is an opportunity for the
post-Soviet countries to strengthen their bargaining power. The Customs Union
of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia (along with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in the
future) will be more effective as a strong partner for the EU and other partners
than the activities of individual countries [PIEESC, 2012].
On the other hand, some specialists predict the end of the idea of a united re-
gion and the start of a fragmentation processes, which means external multi-
vector relations of individual pathways. Pro-integration will can be observed in
the post-Soviet area, but mainly within particular sub-regions; it thus assumes dif-
ferent forms than the reintegration initiated by Russia (bottom-up integration).
According to Evgeny Vinokurov, regional integration should be understood
as a tool, not as a purpose (“pragmatic Eurasianism”). It is a base of successful
bottom-up integration – free flow of goods, services, labour, and capital (to guar-
antee long-term stability and success of the integration project) [Vinokurov, 2013].
Non-democratic regimes of the post-soviet area, including the Central Asia re-
publics, in many ways perceive the process of regional integration (especially at
the regional security level) as a threat to their independence and use it as an in-
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strument of institutional protection of their national independence and sover-
eignty. This kind of top-down integration in Central Asia is being called “protec-
tive integration” [Nikitina, 2011].
Unlike regional security organizations, the CSTO and the SCO, some of the re-
gional economic organizations, such as the EurAsEC and the ECO, seem to dem-
onstrate a political will of further deeper integration. However, it should be noted
that mutual intraregional relations in Central Asia are weak due to the asymmetric
connections with Russia as a dominant player in the former Soviet Union space.
They are not able to deepen their multilateral relations at the sub-region level
without any external initiative. The countries of Central Asia belong to the group
of landlocked countries with less openness and access to international markets
[Libman, 2012].
The post-Soviet Central Asian republics, in spite of their interdependence
with Russia and decrease in the intraregional economic activity, do cooperate
with other external partners (China, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, EU, ECO, or SCO).
Multi-vector activities of the Central Asian states, mainly Kazakhstan, Turkmeni-
stan, and Uzbekistan, come from their geographical location, profiles of their
economies based on natural resources, and security stabilization needs. On the
other hand, “The New Great Game” in the region brought about new integration
strategies of “balance” between China and Russia.
The project is financed by founds of National Science Center based on the
number of decision DEC-2011/03/B/HS4/05/930.
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